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Abstract
This is a response to Ruitenberg’s (2015) argument that citizenship-as-equality should be the focus of
citizenship education. My aim in the response is to offer clarifying comments and questions and suggest further ideas for expanding her analysis, highlighting in particular two perspectives that deserve
more attention: first, the role of emotions in the constitution of political subjectification and the practice of equality; second, the possible openings that might be created when the notion of citizenship-
as-equality is utilized as a point of departure to instill more criticality in students’ understandings of
and feelings about citizenship.

This article is a response to:
Ruitenberg, C. (2015). The practice of equality: A critical understanding of democratic citizenship
education. Democracy & Education, 23(1), Article 2. Retrieved from http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/val23/iss1/2

R

uitenberg (2015) has written a compelling article in
which she argues that citizenship-as-equality should
be the focus of citizenship education. Ruitenberg
grounds her analysis of the meaning and role of equality in citizenship and politics in the work of Balibar (1988, 1996, 2008, 2010a,
2010b) and Rancière (1991/1987, 1995/1992, 1999/1995, 2002, 2004,
2006) as well as in Biesta’s (2011a, 2011b) discussions on the implications of Rancière’s ideas in the context of education. Rancière has
maintained that equality is a premise rather than a goal in thinking
about democracy and citizenship; as he has suggested, there is
already “equality of intelligence” among human beings, because we
are capable of creating meaningful lives with one another. Therefore,
equality is not something to aim for, but rather it constitutes the
point of departure for reflecting on ourselves and our situations.
Taking equality as presupposition, suggests Ruitenberg, does not
imply that we fail to recognize or struggle against the inequality of
social conditions; rather, the emphasis shifts from what we can do to
help people achieve the equality of consciousness they already have
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to the new possibilities that emerge when people are treated as if
they have equality of consciousness. Ruitenberg uses these theoretical positions to instill back in citizenship education its lost criticality
and politics; she argues that if we are to move away from citizenship
education as preparation for a well-defined identity of citizen
attached to nation-state and move to a conception that fosters
commitment to equality, we need curricula and policies that give
room to political subjectification and engage students in the
enactment of this political role.
I concur with Ruitenberg’s (2015) argument, and I find her
analysis of citizenship-as-equality as well as the idea of
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practice-of-equality in the context of citizenship education
extremely insightful. My aim in this response is to offer clarifying
comments and questions and suggest further ideas for expanding
her analysis, highlighting in particular two perspectives that, in my
view, deserve more attention: first, the role of emotions in the
constitution of political subjectification and the practice of
equality; and, second, the possible openings that might be created
when the notion of citizenship-as-equality is utilized as a point of
departure to instill more criticality in students’ understandings
of and feelings about citizenship.
Ruitenberg (2015) begins her article by acknowledging that
citizenship is a contested concept. Indeed, as it is documented in
the vast literature on this topic, citizenship refers to a number of
things such as membership to a nation-state, identity, community,
rights and responsibilities, and shared values or morals (Knight
Abowitz & Harnish, 2006). In his classic work on the different
elements of citizenship and its progression over time, Marshall
(1964) traced how the conception of citizenship expanded in the
last two centuries to include civic, political, and social aspects;
Marshall’s analysis showed the complexities not only of this
expansion of the conception of citizenship but also the fierce
debates in scholarly and other attempts to define citizenship and its
boundaries. These complexities and debates are particularly
evident in recent social and political developments as a result of
worldwide immigration and transnational movements; at the same
time, however, it is recognized that the idea of citizenship as
membership to a nation-state has not lost its currency (Banks,
2008; Pinson, Arnot, & Candappa, 2010). Ruitenberg rightly points
out that citizenship education’s emphasis on the personal and the
social (e.g., the notion of “good citizenship” as smooth community
relations among people) is highly problematic, because the
political aspects of citizenship are ignored. That is, in an effort to
push personal and social understandings of citizenship to respond
to the new challenges of multicultural societies, something
important is lost in the process. What is needed, therefore,
according to Ruitenberg, is an understanding as well as a practice
of citizenship that places its political aspects in the center. To
accomplish this, Ruitenberg turns to the work of Balibar and
Rancière and uses their ideas to restore the lost centrality of the
political in debates about citizenship.1
In particular, Ruitenberg (2015) highlights that Rancière and
Balibar make a significant contribution “because they emphasize
not just the importance of disagreement but, more particularly,
disagreement about and in the name of citizen’s equality” (p. 3,
original emphasis). Ruitenberg’s concern with the importance of
disagreement emphasizes the political aspects of disruption that
comes with/from disagreement. Unlike Rancière—and like Balibar
and Biesta—Ruitenberg insists on democracy and politics as
taking place within institutions of any social order, not only in
moments of disruption. Ruitenberg’s move to consider the
institutional dimension in her discussion of disagreement is
important, because schooling is a typical institution around the
world; therefore, the implications of theorizing disagreement are
particularly relevant for education. If disagreement is valorized, it
is because it constitutes an important political tool of contestation
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and disruption of what is taken for granted in institutions like
schooling. Ruitenberg’s turn to Balibar instead of Rancière at this
point makes sense, because Balibar’s understanding of disagreement within institutions of any social order provides a wider
political theorization of disagreement and disruption.
More particularly, Ruitenberg (2015) uses Balibar’s distinction
of the historical idea of citizenship into two central aspects: one
that is tied to the state and introduces inequality as it distinguishes
between citizens and noncitizens (statutory or legal aspect) and
one that refers to the capacity of individuals to participate in public
decisions and introduces equality as it emphasizes the capacity of
citizens to create and change the borders of the community to
which they belong (egalitarian or constitutive aspect). Unlike the
focus of many contemporary nation-states in the former aspect of
citizenship, Balibar and therefore Ruitenberg are more interested
in the latter, because their concern is how the egalitarian aspect is
constituted and cultivated within a community. Although Ruitenberg, after Balibar, acknowledges that there is an inherent tension
between these two aspects of citizenship, a clarifying point or
question arises: How can citizens reclaim their constitutive powers,
when contemporary nation-states still exercize their immense
power to delimit citizenship in statutory terms? Ruitenberg’s
suggestion that the current emphasis on statutory aspects of
citizenship demands greater focus on citizenship as a practice of
identification with public issues that are of a common concern is
not a response to above question. Rather, this suggestion seems to
ignore a powerful driving force that navigates citizenship-as-
practice toward directions that may in fact reinforce citizenship in
statutory terms: how citizens (are systematically taught to) feel
about their attachment to a nation-state and their belonging more
generally.2 Ruitenberg acknowledges in passing Biesta’s point that
commitment to equality as citizenship is not just a rational
understanding but an emotional involvement, yet the issue is not
further developed. But why is this point so important, especially in
citizenship education?
Notions of citizenship as loyalty and attachment to the nation
or citizenship as compassion for the Other are citizenship practices
that entail important affective elements (Fortier, 2008). The
concept of affective citizenship is used in recent years to mark the
emotions that citizens are encouraged to feel about their membership or belonging to a community such as the nation-state (Jones,
2005). Regardless of how citizenship is defined—for example,
either in statutory or in egalitarian terms—citizenship constitutes
an affective practice highlighting which emotional relationships
between citizens are recognized and endorsed or rejected, and how
citizens are encouraged to feel about themselves and others
(Johnson, 2010). The egalitarian aspect of citizenship, for example,
entails certain emotional injunctions such as “embracing the
Other” (p. 77) as equal. In light of arguments that these emotional
injunctions imply ambivalent rather than monolithic notions
about the (affective) citizen being promoted in schools, all assumptions that inform discourses of citizenship education in contemporary multicultural societies need to be critically interrogated for
their underlying emotional implications and the ambivalent
obligations they may create (Zembylas, 2014).
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Studies on the cultural politics of emotion in the last decade
suggest that notions of citizenship and identity have a deeply
affective basis (Ahmed, 2004; Fortier, 2008; Westen, 2007).3 The
affective basis of citizenship is achieved through what Fortier
(2010) called “governing through affect” (p. 17), that is, the prescription of one’s feelings for the community to which he or she belongs
and for those who are deemed similar or different. At first glance,
this definition might seem to apply only to the statutory aspect of
citizenship; however, as Fortier explained, governing through affect
has two important components that make it relevant not only to the
statutory aspect of citizenship but also to its egalitarian sense. First,
governing through affect determines how individuals are affectively governed by others (e.g., the state, fellow citizens, social and
political organizations). For example, the struggle of citizens to
change the borders of the community and make it more inclusive,
as part of the egalitarian sense of citizenship, is not affectively
neutral or utterly noble; this struggle and the strategies it entails
operate on a biopolitical mode of power that is deeply affective
(Fortier, 2010). Engaging students in citizenship as practice, then,
as Ruitenberg (2015) suggests, has important affective and political
consequences that need to be examined.
The second component of governing through affect is that it
indicates how affective subjects learn to govern themselves by
expressing “appropriate” feelings and especially those of “good
citizenship.” For example, what would be the affective and political
consequences, if students learned to express intense disagreement
and even anger against inequalities in their communities?4 What
would be strategically the most empathetic ways of showing
solidarity to the Other in a community in which there are strong
feelings against the Muslim neighbor, the suicide bomber, minorities, and so on? It is important to remember that any sense of
citizenship can work as governing through affect, that is, as a way of
policing the emotional constitution of a community, even if the
efforts are toward expanding the boundaries of this community.
The danger here is replacing one “tyranny” with another and using
that to instill new “noble” feelings that are (supposedly) more
inclusive.
I want to argue, therefore, that a critical understanding of
democratic citizenship education might be contrived, if it ignores
important elements of affective citizenship (see also, Hung, 2010).
For this reason, I want to expand Ruitenberg’s (2015) analysis here
by arguing more explicitly that critical or transformative citizenship education (Banks, 2004, 2007, 2008; DeJaeghere & Tudball,
2007; Johnson & Morris, 2010) could be enriched in ways that
acknowledge the contributions of citizenship as an affective
practice too. That is, an enriched version of democratic citizenship with perspectives of affective citizenship could identify more
effectively and critically the multiple emotional attachments of
students and teachers and their implications in everyday life
(Zembylas, 2014). For example, thinking critically about the
affective aspects of citizenship may help students engage in
examining the ways in which the nation-state uses various
mechanisms to establish and police boundaries of belonging in
the community or may help them interrogate the consequences of
these mechanisms for how citizens engage in the democratic
democracy & education, vol 23, n-o 1

process, when students from a young age are systematically
directed to feel certain emotions (e.g., pride) about the nation-
state, while silencing others (e.g., shame).
A broader understanding of democratic citizenship education along the lines of affective aspects of citizenship would imply
the acknowledgement that emotions constitute an important part
of citizenship education’s emphasis on equality, not the least of
which is addressing the questions: What emotional practices are
required for the constitution of citizenship-as-equality? How can
educators in citizenship education respond to the emotional
complexities of cultivating the notion of citizenship-as-equality?
In what ways does interrogating the affective aspects of citizenship education help students engage in the practice of
citizenship-as-equality?
Responses to these questions could indeed enrich efforts
toward a critical understanding of democratic citizenship
education that would problematize how emotional attachments
and citizenship discourses and practices are entangled in the
day-to-day routines of life in a multicultural society. This critical
understanding could also lead to a more nuanced analysis of how
students’ different emotional histories influence their decision
making, their actions, and their understandings of membership,
identity, and community (Zembylas, 2009). For example,
students bring to school their own emotional histories about the
people they are becoming—in relation to crucial social and
political factors such as gender, race, class, sexuality, ethnicity,
religion, and nationality—in their own communities and what
implications that has for how they engage in the practice of
citizenship-as-equality. It is possible, then, that nation-state
citizenship may serve to establish exclusions and disempower
individuals and groups (e.g., recent immigrants, refugees, or
asylum seekers) who conceive of and feel about citizenship
differently. This perspective is particularly relevant given the
historical and contemporary engagement of citizens-in-practice
(but not in status) in arguing for rights they know they have—
having already achieved equality of consciousness. Therefore, an
integrated understanding of affective citizenship and democratic
citizenship education would provide a more holistic description
of the ways in which students’ emotional histories are embedded
in wider contexts of sociopolitical forces, needs, and interests.
This would further highlight the role of citizenship education as
fostering commitment to equality through the notion of political
subjectification—another important idea that is discussed in
Ruitenberg’s (2015) article.
Following Biesta, Ruitenberg (2015) argues that a curriculum
or policy needs to provide space to political subjectification; for this
purpose, she suggests, there are two key features that need to be
fulfilled: the first is the extent to which a curriculum or policy
acknowledges and promotes an egalitarian sense of citizenship, and
the second is the extent to which a curriculum or policy positions
citizenship as something that can be enacted now rather than
something that prepares students to enact in the future. Although
Ruitenberg recognizes the challenges of determining how these
features might indeed be present in a curriculum or policy, she
makes an attempt to examine whether two particular cases of
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citizenship education curriculum and policy hold up under this
theoretical lens. In the first case, Ruitenberg examines a curriculum document for Civic Studies 11 in British Columbia in conjunction with its teaching at a high school. In particular, she refers to
the teacher’s narration how one of his students became passionate
about a public issue and delivered an unsolicited speech about this
issue outside the Parliament. Ruitenberg concludes that “the
course can create opportunities for students to become not just
rationally but also passionately involved in political issues” (p. 6,
original emphasis). In the second case, Ruitenberg takes up a
curriculum framework on social responsibility in British Columbia. In her analysis of this document on the basis of the two features
set earlier, Ruitenberg points out that this curriculum framework
encourages personal and social aspects of citizenship and fails to
cultivate the egalitarian and political aspects of citizenship that she
has emphasized.
Needless to say, the choice to examine two specific cases,
whether a curriculum or a policy, provides space to political
subjectification is a laudable effort by Ruitenberg (2015) to
translate her theory into practice. And, indeed, we should look at
these two cases merely as examples of this translation effort,
because in reality, the analysis of whether a curriculum or a
policy provides space to political subjectification is far more
complex and multifaceted than the intentions of a written
document or its enactment by a single teacher. For example, the
determination of the role and meaning of passion in the context
of politics is much more complicated than a student’s protest
outside the Parliament (e.g., Mouffe, 2002). But, to be fair to
Ruitenberg, this lack of detailed analysis is somewhat expected, if
one takes into consideration the space limitations in a paper of
this scope and length. What is perhaps less expected, though, is a
relative fading of the practical meanings and implications of the
idea of citizenship-as-equality in the classroom. For example,
Ruitenberg reiterates in her conclusion that citizenship should be
understood in the sense “of the equal capacity of everybody to
voice and enact citizenship” (p. 7). But the following questions
arise: What new pedagogical and political possibilities can
emerge, when students are treated as if they already have this
equal capacity? What would these possibilities look like in
practice? What is missing—not necessarily from Ruitenberg’s
analysis—is precisely an effort to create not only the necessary
languages of political subjectification but also the necessary
practices and actions in the classroom that enact citizenship-as-
equality and explore its tensions and possibilities.
The above questions can be initially described in practice as
having four distinctive elements along Cogan, Morris, and Print’s
(2002) definition of citizenship education as the formation of the
knowledge, skills, values, and dispositions of citizens. Along each
dimension of those elements, some suggestions are provided below
concerning citizenship teaching and learning in an effort to
exemplify some of the practical implications of Ruitenberg’s (2015)
proposition (for a similar exercise, see Zembylas, 2014):
•

Knowledge: Construct knowledge and understanding about
the meaning of citizenship-as-equality in different social,
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•

•

•

cultural, historical, and political contexts (e.g., are there
cultural variations in the experience and expression of
citizenship-as-equality?). Identify the underlying assumptions and implications (e.g., emotional, political, pedagogical) of the notion of citizenship-as-equality and analyze
how these assumptions are different or similar to statutory
aspects and may influence citizens’ decision making and
actions.
Skills: Develop the capacity to expose and critique the
entanglements of citizenship perceptions, emotions, and
political structures in schools and multicultural societies.
Become capable to critically assess political subjectification
and its various manifestations.
Values: Trace how one’s own and others’ values are entangled with the egalitarian aspect of citizenship (compared
also with what has been the traditional emphasis so far)
and explore the ethical and political grounds for acting on
the basis of egalitarian values. Develop a commitment to
an ethic that recognizes the emotional ambivalences and
complexities that are involved in enacting those values.
Dispositions: Take responsibility for decisions and actions
that are grounded in the notion of citizenship-as-equality.
Address in practice the consequences of these decisions and
actions and examine whether any they disrupt or perpetuate
inequalities and injustices in schools and the society.

The above points are used merely as examples of recognizing
the potential contribution of the notion of citizenship-as-equality
to critical and democratic citizenship education; they are not
exemplary in any sense, and certainly they do not exhaust all the
possibilities of what sorts of knowledge, skills, values, and
dispositions are important in the citizenship-as-equality curriculum. As Ruitenberg (2015) suggests toward the end of her article,
a critical and self-reflective citizenship education is one that
discusses “how people can enact citizenship-as-equality even if
they not achieved citizenship-as-status” (p. 8), that is, “a citizenship education that considers its own conditions and boundaries
[and] would include, for example, discussion about which
members of society do not have rights as members of polity” (p.
8). An enriched framework for critical and democratic citizenship education that takes into consideration the implications of
citizenship-as-equality is more likely to acknowledge the
complexities (including emotional ones) that frequently remain
unnoticed when the political aspects of citizenship are strengthened in citizenship education.
Reconceptualizing critical and democratic citizenship
education in terms of the notion of citizenship-as-equality has
two important advantages, and Ruitenberg (2014) along with
Biesta and other education scholars are to be commended for
their contributions toward this direction. First, it restores a sense
of critical and democratic citizenship on the basis of the sense
that there is equal capacity of everybody to voice and enact
citizenship. This form of democratic citizenship education
includes as its important component a mode of political critique
that understands the different economies of citizenship as well as
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their effects on students and teachers’ lives (see also, Zembylas,
2014). Students and teachers may bring different emotional
histories with them to school, but they have a capacity to voice
and enact their citizenship; the important contribution here is the
link that is made between the egalitarian aspect of citizenship and
the critical interrogation of naive or romanticized views of
democratic citizenship.
Second, the notion of citizenship-as-equality in democratic
citizenship education creates openings for constructing and
sustaining new spaces of political subjectification. Inasmuch as a
democratic citizenship education acknowledges how schooling
and other institutions perpetuate hegemonic discourses about
statutory citizenship, educators and their students need to
examine the political spaces that may be constituted to disrupt
these hegemonies. Citizenship-as-equality offers some possibilities for transforming educators and students’ dispositions;
however, we need more empirical explorations of the challenges
in efforts to create these new political spaces. The disruption of
normative politics around citizenship is certainly not an easy task
for educators (Zembylas, 2009). The knowledge, skills, values,
and dispositions of hegemonic citizenship education discourses
are not easily suspended, as they are deeply rooted in the emotional ideologies of the nation state (Bekerman & Zembylas,
2012). As a theoretical and practical scaffold, a framework for
democratic citizenship education that includes the notion of
citizenship-as-equality requires the transformation of the very
conditions, emotional and otherwise, of the production and
reproduction of the hegemonic economies of citizenship in
schools and multicultural societies (Zembylas, 2014). Needless to
say, this is a monumental task, yet the work by Ruitenberg (2015)
and others shows that there is critical hope in the small openings
that seem to emerge from disrupting understandings of citizenship with the notion of citizenship-as-equality.

Notes
1. As one of this paper’s reviewers correctly pointed out, my
claim here does not imply that the problem is one of theory; the
problem is one of culture and practice in citizenship education.
Therefore, what I am suggesting is that Ruitenberg is right to turn to
Balibar and Rancière in that their ideas are valuable points of
departure for recentering the political in debates about citizenship
and citizenship education.
2. A classic example of the emotions of citizenship is when
children learn to sing the national anthem or patriotic songs (e.g.,
“God Bless America”) from a young age, many years before they
learn to think critically about their nation-state. I am indebted to
one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this example.
3. My theorization here is grounded in perspectives on the
cultural politics of emotion (e.g., Ahmed, 2004) and critical work
on emotion in education (e.g., Boler, 1999), which challenge
hegemonic notions of knowledge and rationality and argue that
emotions are crucial to how the social and the political are reproduced through power relations.
4. The legitimacy of emotions like anger is discussed here as
part of a wide range of civic experiences and responses to events of
democracy & education, vol 23, n-o 1

the polis. As one of the anonymous reviewers correctly pointed out,
learning to govern—control but express—these emotions is indeed
important. Therefore, I am not suggesting a notion of ungoverned
anger—which can become violent rage. My point is that anger,
conflict, and disagreement are all viable parts of our experiences in
our roles as citizens.
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